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Abstract 
The vulnerability of the tourism industry to a range of crises has attracted many scholars to investigate the 
crisis strategies and practices employed by destinations and tourism organizations mainly with regards to 
crisis preparedness, containment and damage limitation, crisis recovery and subsequent learning. One over-
looked area has been that of crisis signal detection. This paper proposes a three-stage conceptual 
framework for crisis signal detection consisting of signal scanning, capture and transmission to the crisis 
response centre. With this framework as a basis, 16 corporate level executives of international tourism 
organizations were interviewed in order to explore the significance of signal detection in their crisis 
management practice and the challenges faced in each of these three stages. The findings offer insights into 
the design of crisis management mechanisms and open areas for further research. 
Keywords: Crisis management, crisis signals, signal detection, critical incident technique, environmental 
scanning  
1. Introduction
The tourism industry is prone to crises as it is highly fragmented and complex with many 
interdependencies among its sectors. These interdependencies mean that a crisis in a 
tourism sector will have repercussions in the others. Henderson (2007: 8) argued that a 
transport accident, a hotel fire or a street riot in which tourists will be caught up will 
impact tourist arrivals in a destination with impacts on accommodation, attraction and 
transport providers as well as a number of other tourism stakeholders such as tour 
operators, travel agents and the destination’s tourism authorities. Similarly, events that 
are not directly connected to tourism may have a huge impact on tourism sectors as 
witnessed in the 1997 Asian financial crisis (De Sausmarez, 2004), the 2001 World Trade 
Centre terrorist attack (Ito & Lee, 2005), the SARS epidemic (Pine & McKercher, 2004), 
the Indian Ocean tsunami (Rittichainuwat, 2006). It is noteworthy, however, that most 
crises do not occur suddenly. Mitroff (1988:18) observed that “long before its actual 
occurrence, a crisis sends off a repeated and persistent trail of early warning signals” 
which could be picked up at a time where there is still opportunity to prevent it from 
occurring  or to take measures that will minimise its impact. These early warning or crisis 
signals are pieces of information indicating deviation from normalcy (e.g., financial 
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indicators exceeding a threshold, abnormal patterns of social behaviour, etc.) that may 
escalate and lead to a crisis.  For example, a receding ocean following an earthquake felt 
in the coast may be an indication of an approaching tsunami, an unusually increased 
number of patients with respiratory problems admitted in a hospital may be an indication 
of an emerging epidemic and an increased number of clashes between religious sects in a 
destination may indicate possible political unrest. Early detection of these signals and 
timely response to them might have saved a good part of the 230,000 lives claimed by the 
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, of the 41% of tourism GDP that Hong Kong has lost due to 
SARS in 2003 or of the more than $600 million Bahrain has lost due to the cancellation 
of the Formula 1 Grand Prix in 2011.  
 
Several scholars in the field of crisis management (Boin 2003; Boin & Lagadec, 2000; 
Takeda & Helms, 2006) have suggested that as crises are dynamic in nature with events 
morphing at varying rates of acceleration and deceleration. Small changes in the 
parameters of a crisis may ultimately cause enormous changes in its outcome as minute 
initial differences are magnified and transformed by the dynamical processes at work 
(“butterfly effect”, Lorenz, 1993) rendering the crisis extremely sensitive to the initial 
conditions of its evolution (Paraskevas, 2006). This sensitivity underlines the importance 
of early interventions in crisis development and, therefore, of processes able to capture 
the crisis dynamism through the detection, transmission and interpretation of the signals 
it emanates. With this thinking, Mitroff (1988) proposed a five phase (“five mechanisms” 
- in his terms) crisis management model: signal detection; preparation/prevention; 
containment (damage limitation); recovery; and learning. This model pre-supposes a 
signal detection mechanism for better crisis preparedness and even prevention of a crisis. 
  
The subject of tourism crises has attracted the attention of several scholars in the field 
resulting in a significant body of literature. These studies have contributed a lot in 
evaluating the impact of crises on tourism (e.g., Blake & Sinclair , 2003; Eugenio-Martin, 
Sinclair & Yeoman, 2005; Pizam & Fleischer, 2002), addressing particular aspects of 
crisis management, mainly destination recovery (e.g., Beirman, 2003; Israeli & Reichel, 
2003; Prideaux, 2004) or focusing on lessons learned from crises (e.g., De Sausmarez, 
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2004; Henderson, 2003 a,b; Miller & Ritchie, 2003). However none of them has looked 
at crisis signals and what Mitroff (1988) calls “crisis detection mechanism”. Even the few 
studies that propose more strategic approaches to tourism crisis/disaster management 
(Faulkner, 2001; Ritchie, 2004) just touch upon crisis signal detection. Key research 
questions such as how should a signal detection mechanism be designed, what types of 
detectors it should use and for what signals it should look and where, largely remain with 
no answer. 
 
This paper aims to narrow this research gap, by exploring the ‘mechanism’ of crisis 
signal detection in the context of the tourism organizations. We first look at the crisis 
literature within tourism and we develop a conceptual framework for the detection 
process of crisis signals based on a number of theories including the information 
communication theory and the signal detection theory. We then conduct a fieldwork with 
16 corporate level executives of international tourism organizations in order to explore 
the significance of signal detection in their crisis management practice, the way it is 
designed and the challenges they are facing. The paper concludes with suggestions for 
further research on the topic.  
 
2. Crisis Management in Tourism  
As with the generic crisis management literature, Santana (2004: 307) concluded that ‘the 
[tourism] literature provides no generally accepted definition of crisis” since there are 
several definitions for the term “tourism crisis” (e.g., Beirman, 2003; Faulkner, 2001; 
Glaesser, 2003; Henderson, 2007; Ritchie, 2004). The more comprehensive definition, 
however, is perhaps offered by Sönmez et al (1994) who state that a tourism crisis is: 
 
“any occurrence which can threaten the normal operation and conduct of tourism 
related businesses; damage a tourist destination’s overall reputation for safety, 
attractiveness and comfort by negatively affecting visitors’ perceptions of that 
destination; and, in turn, cause a downturn in the local travel and tourism 
economy and interrupt the continuity of business operations for the local travel 
and tourism industry by the reduction in tourist arrivals and expenditures.” 
(Sönmez, Backman & Allen, 1994: 22) 
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 There are four clearly defined streams of research in the area of crisis management in 
tourism. The first stream of research focuses on the impact of crises on tourism and 
started with Mihalic (1999) looking at the impact of the war in Yugoslavia’s tourism 
industry and Henderson (1999 a,b,c) evaluating the impact of Asian financial crisis on 
tourism. A study with significant contribution in understanding the impact of terrorism in 
tourism was undertaken by Pizam and Smith (2000) who did a comprehensive analysis of 
terrorism events around the world during the period between 1985 and 1998. These 
researchers described the crisis events in detail offering authors’ analyses and 
participants’ insights about the crises under investigation as well as evaluation of its 
impacts on the economies of different destinations leading them to suggestions about the 
need for post-crisis response and actions to minimise the impacts of crises on tourism 
organizations and destinations.  
 
The second stream of research focuses on the recovery aspect of crisis management by 
rebuilding the destination image through appropriate crisis communications and 
marketing initiatives (Beirman, 2003; Fall, 2004; Fall & Massey, 2006; Frisby, 2002), 
identifying ways by which destinations can re-establish tourist confidence (Armstrong & 
Ritchie, 2008; Cavlek, 2002; Huan et al., 2004) and by implementing specific business 
recovery strategies (Anderson, 2006; Leung & Lam, 2004; Litvin & Alderson, 2003; Lo 
et al., 2006). Researchers in this stream also identified the importance of the development 
of crisis management teams, disaster management plan testing, employee training for 
crises and the protection of guests from disasters (Brewton, 1987; Burby & Wagner, 
1996; Drabek, 1995) at the post crisis stage. Significant contributions were made by these 
researchers who studied the damage limitation practices of tourism  organizations. This 
stream is taking a more reactive approach to crisis management thus completely ignoring 
the possibility of crisis signals and their detection.  
 
The third stream of crisis management research highlights the importance of pre-crisis 
stage and argues that both hospitality organizations and tourist destinations need to 
understand the causes and consequences of previous crises in order to plan and prepare 
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themselves for the future ones. The main focus of researchers in this stream has been the 
phenomenon of global terrorism (Stafford et al., 2002; Taylor & Enz, 2002; Cushnahan, 
2004, etc.) as well as the two great epidemics (Foot and Mouth Disease and Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome) which affected tourism not only in the UK, Southeast Asia and 
Canada but globally (Sharpley & Craven, 2001; Coles, 2003; Ritchie et al., 2004; 
Henderson, 2004; McKercher & Chon, 2004; Kim et al., 2005, etc.). Natural disasters 
ranging from hurricanes in the US (Chandler, 2004) to wildfires and floods in Australia 
(Faulkner & Vikulov, 2001; Armstrong, 2005; Armstrong & Ritchie, 2005) and to the 
devastating Indian Ocean Tsunami (Henderson, 2005; Carlsen, 2006; Rittichainuwat, 
2006, etc.) have also been investigated.  The study of these crises was aiming mainly at 
evaluating the industry’s response and at identifying best practice to be used in similar 
situations in the future (Armstrong, 2005; Henderson, 2003 a,b; Henderson, 2004; 
Johnson-Tew et al., 2008).  Scholars in this stream maintain that learning from the 
previous crises is crucial for the management of a crisis. Although this stream sets a good 
foundation in understanding the importance of preparedness by learning from the 
previous crises as well as potentially best practice in crisis response, the relevant studies 
do not propose a holistic crisis management strategy or a framework capturing the 
different “mechanisms” of crisis management, thus leaving signal detection largely out of 
their discussion. .  
 
The last stream of the literature integrates the extant knowledge of generic crisis and 
disaster management, and proposes succinct strategies, models and frameworks for a 
‘holistic’ crisis/disaster management in tourism (for example, Faulkner, 2001; Glaesser, 
2003; Ritchie, 2004). Drawing on insights from the broader disaster management 
literature, Faulkner (2001) produced a generic model for analysing and developing 
tourism disaster management strategies. Prideaux (2004), evaluated Australia's response 
to tourism disasters in 2001, using Faulkner’s (2001) framework and concluded that 
response would be far more effective should the government adopt such a framework, 
whereas Miller and Ritchie (2003) applied the model on the outbreak of Foot and Mouth 
Disease in UK and found that, due to the nature of the disaster, it would serve only as an 
analytical tool rather than a preventative tool for tourism organizations. Following this 
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study Ritchie (2004) proposed a more ‘holistic’ strategic approach to crisis management 
which starts with proactive pre-crisis planning, goes through strategy implementation and 
ends with evaluation and feedback. These frameworks have set a solid foundation based 
on which other researchers attempted to built their own disaster management models such 
as the one proposed by Hystad and Keller (2008) which draws from both these 
frameworks and the researchers experience from the Kelowna forest fires or the one 
proposed by Paraskevas and Arendell (2007) which aims at mitigating terrorist attacks to 
a destination.  The models proposed in this stream touch broadly upon the concept of 
crisis signal detection and some make reference to early warning systems, however, they 
do not provide answers to key questions such as how these detection systems should be 
designed, where the scanning for crisis signals should take place, what types of detectors 
they should use and how the captured signals should be transmitted to the decision 
making centres. The following section draws upon the signal detection literature in order 
to conceptualise these questions.  
 
 
3. Crisis Signals and Detection of Signals 
Crisis signals were first discussed in the late 1970s and 1980s a period characterised by a 
number of industrial disasters and transport accidents. Turner (1976) in his “Disaster 
Incubation Theory” argues that disasters are caused due to the accumulation of events are 
at odds with organizational norms about safe operation: “…a multiplicity of minor 
causes, misperceptions, misunderstandings and miscommunications accumulate during 
this [disaster] incubation period” (Turner, 1994:216). These events remain unnoticed due 
to a range of communication errors which he identifies as signals known and ignored or 
distrusted and signals buried or distributed across the organization, hence not collated. He 
also coins the term ‘organizational exclusivity’ for cases when the organization ignores 
warnings coming from outsiders. Perrow (1981) in his “Normal Accidents Theory” 
maintains that industrial disasters are unintentional failures (“normal accidents”) of 
systems because of their inherent complexity and that disaster signals that may be 
generated from potentially destructive interactions between the various agents of these 
systems are shielded by the technological complexity of organizations.  
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 Crisis signals, as discussed earlier, can be any kind of information (qualitative or 
quantitative) that indicates a deviation from normalcy. In an organizational context can, 
therefore, be viewed as messages or pieces of information about anomalies 
(discontinuities) generated by “organizational imperfections” (failures, breakdowns, 
errors, incidents, near-accidents, unintentional deviations, etc.) in the external (e.g., poor 
quality of raw materials offered by the organization’s suppliers) and/or the internal 
environment of the organization (e.g., a steady increase of employee absences) that “can 
be interpreted as symptoms or peaks in the development of a crisis” (Roux-Dufort, 2007: 
231).  
 
Some scholars have expressed their reservations about the existence of these signals 
claiming ‘hindsight bias’ – the tendency, in retrospect, to overestimate the amount of 
available information on a threat at the time of decision making (Dekker, 2002, Fischoff 
& Beyth 1975; Gephart, 1993; Woods, 2005). Nevertheless, the concept of signals that 
warn about an emerging crisis (or opportunity) has been widely supported in the generic 
management literature under different terminology such as weak signals (Ansoff, 1984), 
wild cards (Hiltunen, 2006), early indicators (Petersen, 1999), early warnings 
(Inayatullah, 1995) and emerging issues (Stevenson, 2002). 
 
With appropriate signal detection mechanisms in place crisis signals can be picked up in 
time and then, some -if not all- crises can be averted before they happen. One notable 
attempt to investigate the factors that affect signal detection was made by Scheaffer et al., 
(1998) who, through their investigation of the Barings crisis, propose a model that 
summarises the process of “tackling early warning signals” (EWS) by identifying crisis 
practices, organizational characteristics and patterns that hinder signal detection. The 
authors suggest that the factors influencing signal detection and problem sensing are 
cultural, structural, psychological and professional while they acknowledge that 
exogenous factors may play their role as well. Although, their attempt is very helpful in 
many senses, the factors identified came from the investigation of a single financial crisis 
and the authors themselves acknowledge (p.17) that their model is “potentially useful”, 
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yet “unsophisticated”. There have also been several attempts to create early warning 
systems focusing mainly on natural disasters (e.g., Zschau & Küppers, 2003), geophysics 
and financial markets (Sornette, 2004) and financial crises (e.g., Berg & Pattillo, 1999; 
Kaminsky et al, 1998), however, their predictive power has been proven questionable. A 
much more helpful study was the one conducted by Judith Ann Clair who investigated an 
insurance company and its medical division facing a possible financial as well as public 
relations crisis in the period prior and up to 1991, and was the first to suggest a six-step 
crisis signal detection framework (1993: 65-79) involving activities grouped into two 
categories: a) activities triggered by a need to define crisis signals (identifying potential 
signals, locating data in these signals and interpreting the signals); and b) activities 
triggered by a need to resolve a potential crisis (stabilising the potential crisis, planning a 
method to avert the crisis and resolving the crisis). According to  Clair (1993), the signal 
detection process should have “interim goals” that exist at each point in detection and 
“ultimate consequences” (p. 65). The first goal of the process is the creation of a shared 
understanding about the situation and of a consensus for a commitment to the crisis 
response activities. The second is the establishment of accountability with regards to 
these response activities and the third is the reduction of key organization members’ 
uncertainty by creating awareness about the emerging crisis. The eventual outcomes (or 
consequences) of the process will be changes in the organization’s core beliefs about its 
vulnerability to certain threats and its procedures and structures for crisis detection. Until 
1993 authors had talked about crisis signal detection as a general concept but did not 
specify, within the definition, what sort of action was needed for effective signal 
detection to take place.  
 
After Clair (1993) very few authors in the crisis management field have explored the 
topic. Coombs (1999) presented a ‘crisis sensing mechanism’ from a crisis 
communications perspective as a three-phase process (locating information, funnelling, 
and analysis) and lists potential sources for information for issues management, risk 
assessment and reputation management. Desouza and Hensgen (2005) look at signal 
detection from an information management perspective concentrating on signal 
processing within the organization.  In this sense, it is Clair’s work that sets the 
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foundation for this discussion. Her conception is a more systematic view of what the 
signal detection phase of crisis management should provide to the organization and 
illustrates that signal detection is a dynamic process, not only because information is 
moving within a system of actors, but because the information is itself evolving with the 
purpose of averting the crisis before it escalates. This dynamic process aims at the timely 
scanning for external/internal crisis signals, their capture and their transmission to the 
organization’s decision making centre which, based on the information they carry, will 
decide about potential preventive action. 
 
The following section of the review presents these key stages of the signal detection 
process namely; scanning for signals, signal capture and transmission.  
 
3.1. Scanning for Signals 
Environmental scanning is employed by organizations to make sense of the environment 
in which they operate and is a function strongly supported by business strategy authors, 
despite potential challenges and deterrents that a formal approach to it may present 
(Huffman, 2004; Okumus, 2004). Lozada & Calantone (1996) suggest that the scanning 
could be both structured and unstructured (spontaneous) by combining ad hoc external 
networks with a more formal system for information collection. Huffman (2004: 47-48) 
extends this suggestion by asking for “collective intuitions to synthesize a picture of 
future threats”, “more power … to lower level managers who are the first ones to see the 
writing on the  wall” and a need for organizations “to reduce their vulnerability”. 
Considering that the scanning effort may be both structured and unstructured (Lozada & 
Calantone, 1996) or passive and active (Farh et al., 1984), it is useful to evaluate the 
organization’s environment that should be scanned. The largest part of the business 
strategy literature (e.g., Aguilar, 1967; Fahey & King, 1977, etc.) divides these 
environments into internal (consisting of the organization’s structure, culture, and 
resource variables), task (which includes industry force variables) and general or societal 
(which comprises economic, technological, socio-cultural, and political-legal variables 
affecting the organization).  A relatively different, and perhaps more useful for the 
present study, perspective on the exploration of the information environment is proposed 
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by Alberts et al. (2001) in their research on information warfare operations who suggest a 
division in 3 domains: physical, informational and cognitive. In an organizational 
context, the physical domain encompasses the entire environment the organization 
intends to influence directly or indirectly, e.g., safe production processes and customer 
service, sound fiscal operations, employee training and development, competitive 
environment (with all its components), suppliers, and customers. The information domain 
contains all elements required for the creation, exploration and dissemination of 
information as well as its transformation to explicit/tacit knowledge. Within this domain 
all environmental scanning outputs are gathered through scanning activities undertaken 
by various detectors within and outside the organization and may have a variety of forms 
and different degrees of sensitivity (e.g., data from a direct organization/customer 
encounter, market analyses, situation reports, regional/national per capita consumer 
expenditure, competitive intelligence). The cognitive domain is the place where 
“perceptions, awareness, understanding, beliefs, and values reside and where, as a result 
of sense-making, decisions are made” (Alberts et al., 2001:13). Von Lubitz and 
Wickramasinghe (2006) include in this domain human factors that affect operations, such 
as education, experience, political inclinations, social attributes (behaviours and peer 
interactions), commitment, loyalty, open mindedness and intuition of organizational 
members involved in the relevant activities. 
 
The scanning is performed by detectors which can be technical, human or a combination 
of the two. Technical detectors can be devices or machines that monitor critical for the 
organization functions or data received by its internal or external environment and are 
able to identify changes in them. Human detectors can be members of the organization or 
people external to the organization that have access to data pertinent to its functions and 
are willing to transmit these data to the organization's decision making centres. They may 
be people specifically assigned to signal detection even if this may not be their full-time 
occupation (Regester & Ladkin, 1997). Although Cobb (2003:81) suggested that as much 
as 80% of information needed by the organization already exists inside it, an effective 
signal detection system should include a wide network of external detectors. It is 
important, at this point, to make the distinction between external detectors who are 
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members of the organization detecting signals in the external environment and those who 
are independent from the organization. Several authors (Gilad, 2004; Choo, 1998, 2002) 
warn that organizational culture, perspective, conventional wisdom, and implicit 
assumptions within the organization usually hamper the ability of the former to detect the 
full range of signals available in the environment, whereas external independent detectors 
are able to detect and capture trends or discontinuities way before these manifest 
themselves clearly in data available to everyone. 
 
Once signals are scanned by the organizations, they move to the acceptance/rejection 
stage which is known as signal capture.  
 
3.2. Signal Capture 
At this stage of signal detection process, the critical issue is the detector’s diagnostic 
accuracy, i.e., their ability not to confuse relevant signals with non-signals and other 
irrelevant stimuli (Green & Swets, 1966). There are two broad categories for signal 
capture methods: case definition methods and pattern recognition methods. Case 
definition methods use previous experiences to define an “event of interest” and thus 
track those signals considered of greatest importance (Aamodt & Plaza, 1994; Langseth, 
et al., 1999). Scanning for signals based on the organization’s risk assessment and 
vulnerability analysis would fall into this category. On the other hand, pattern recognition 
methods (Schalkoff, 1991) would be extremely useful in identifying signals (or sets of 
signals) that deviate from the expected baseline (routine) and often result in unknown or 
unimaginable crises. The possible outcomes of the detector’s signal evaluation may be 
one of the following: 
 
1. The detector captures and registers as valid a signal from an emerging threat (true 
alarm - hit) 
2. The detector captures and rejects as noise (or non-signal) a signal from an emerging 
threat (missed alarm – type II error) 
3. The detector captures and rejects as noise (or non-signal) a signal which is noise 
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4. The detector captures and registers as valid a signal which is noise (false alarm – type I 
error) 
 
An ‘optimal’ detection performance would mean a maximum rate of hits with a minimum 
rate of false alarms.  According to Swets (1988), the diagnostic accuracy depends on its 
sensitivity and on the signal specificity. Swets argues that improvement in sensitivity 
usually occurs at the loss of signal specificity, in other words the number of false alarms 
(type I errors) may increase significantly. Consequently, for any type of threat a signal 
detection system can either minimise the missed alarms or minimise the false alarms but 
never both. The optimal level of sensitivity relative to specificity depends on the 
consequences of false and missed alarms and they are almost never symmetrical 
(Puranam et al., 2006). These consequences are not fundamental properties of the 
detection process itself but are specific to the threats for which the detection is 
undertaken. For example, The Economist (2000) states “… it costs some $450,000 to 
prepare a kilometre of coastline for a coming storm…”. An alarm that initiates highly 
disruptive action (e.g., closure of business, evacuation of premises, transfer to back-up 
facilities, etc.) may be perceived as having high economic and emotional cost. If this cost 
is prohibitive, the organization may weigh heavily the probability of false alarms when 
setting the sensitivity threshold. Other scholars too debate against a high sensitivity 
threshold, in that it may cause the ‘cry-wolf phenomenon’ (adapted from Aesop’s fable) 
or ‘false alarm effect’. Breznitz (1984), for example, talks about “the credibility loss [of a 
crisis signal detection system] due to a false alarm” (p.11). Crisis and disaster 
management theorists, however, argue that in real life situations public response to an 
alarm is not diminished, if the basis of a false alarm is understood (Drabek, 1994; Dow & 
Cutter, 1998). 
 
Crisis signals, once generated from their source, have a finite life, they disappear and 
may not appear again until after an ‘avoidable’ crisis becomes manifest. Desouza et al. 
(2004) maintain that the path a crisis signal traverses through has significant bearings on 
whether the decision making centre will receive the intended information, given the many 
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opportunities the crisis signal has to be lost or rendered useless. Therefore, organizations 
need to transmit signals effectively to be able launch preventive measures.  
 
3.3. Signal Transmission 
The third stage of the signal detection process is the development of a clear 
communication platform for the timely and unobstructed transmission of crisis signals 
from detectors who capture them to those with the mandate of launching responsive 
measures. The dynamics of signal transmission between organisational members can be 
explained by the social exchange theory. In Social Exchange Theory, which has been 
successfully applied to social psychology, it is argued that relationships providing more 
rewards than costs lead to mutual trust (Emerson, 1981). Exchange relationships that are 
based on reciprocity and mutual attraction (Granovetter, 1985) enhance the knowledge 
flow leading to more effective organisational functioning (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). In 
particular, social relationships and exchange between the members of organizations 
stimulate creative ideas and new knowledge (Clercq et al., 2010) and such knowledge in 
turn can increase an organisation’s ability to respond to the changes in a dynamic and 
hostile environment (Kim, 1998; Kim and Mauborgne, 1998). 
 
Finkelstein (2003) argues that in some organizations crisis signals are captured but either 
the detectors who captured them do not clearly know where they should direct them or 
the communication platform through which these signals are transmitted is too complex 
and hierarchical to effectively cope with urgent information. Another reason for this is 
that signals may be detected in various parts of the organization or its environment that 
may not be linked. Adelman (1998:65) refers to it as the “dead-ending of information”.  
 
A further problem that can be observed refers to disregarding some signals due to 
transmission channel overload with a multitude of diverse signals that may be attributed 
to the complexity of the emerging crisis or the emergence of more than one crisis at the 
same time. As signals often carry with them some sampling noise (Lloyd & McMillan, 
1956), the transmission of a multitude of diverse crisis signals through the same 
communication platform would only add more sampling noise that might possibly 
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degrade the information carried by the signal.  Schmeidl (2002:78) refers to this problem 
as “noise” or “static” whereas Adelman (1998:65) calls it the “crushing of signals”.  
 
Desouza and Hensgen (2005:73-78) suggest a platform consisting of multiple 
communication lines and a combination of transmitters which they call ‘repeaters’ and 
‘hubs’. The ‘repeaters’ are components whose role is to transfer the signal to a designated 
destination that can be the decision making centre or a decision maker or a ‘hub’. The 
hub receives multiple signals, filters them from noise, regenerates them and possibly 
amplifies them -if needed- in order to extend their life before relaying them back to the 
communication channel towards the decision making centre. Normally the role of such 
hubs would be assumed by middle managers in the organization as they are often viewed 
as ‘gatekeepers’ of information flows (Awazu, 2004; Davenport et al., 1998). 
 
The 3-stage dynamic process of crisis signal detection can therefore be conceptually 
summarized in the framework of Fig. 1 
 
Figure 1 – The Crisis Signal Detection Process 
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 Having established a conceptual model for crisis signal detection, the study moved to 
explore if and how crisis signal detection is practised by tourism organizations (namely: 
what crisis signals they are looking for; what detectors they employ; where they scan for 
signals; how they transmit them to decision makers) and what are the challenges that 
these organizations face when attempting to detect crisis signals.  
 
4. Research Design   
Since crisis signal detection has not been explored in depth in either generic or tourism-
specific crisis management literature, the present study followed an inductive approach to 
research design placing more emphasis on the inductive representation (the “process of 
interpretation” according to Bogdan and Taylor, 1975:14) of a set of empirical judgments 
(raw data, observations, experiences) from which we could build up a set of factual 
propositions, explanations and knowledge about this crisis ‘mechanism’ (Altinay & 
Paraskevas, 2007; Saunders, et al. 2009).  
 
We used a criterion sampling technique for which Patton (2002: 238) states that “the 
logic of criterion sampling is to review and study all cases that meet some predetermined 
criteria of importance”. In this study, the sample had to meet four criteria: corporate level 
tourism professionals; working in a multi-unit national or international tourism 
organizations; being in charge or directly involved with decisions related to risk/crisis 
management; and having experienced at least one crisis incident in their organizations. 
The latter criterion is exactly what Patton (2002) means by ‘criterion of importance’. 
Access was gained to a population that met the three first criteria, through the Global 
Council on Safety, Security and Crisis Management of the International Hotel and 
Restaurant Association (IH&RA) in 2006. The Global Council at the time consisted of 
corporate level executives specialised in the area of crisis and risk management 
(indicative titles: Senior Director Crisis Management & Business Continuity; Vice 
President Risk Management; Vice President Corporate Safety and Security; Director 
Corporate Security; Director of Safety and Security; Chief Security Officer) and CEOs of 
smaller national and international hotel chains. In order to benefit as much as possible 
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from the participants’ crisis management expertise, it was decided for the study to 
explore ‘critical incidents’ in organizations as “focusing on specific events enables the 
participant to provide a fuller, more detailed description of an experience as it was lived” 
(Thompson et al., 1989: 138). The executives were approached and ‘screened’ on the 
basis of their experience and the critical incidents they had dealt with. Through this 
screening and some further ‘snowballing’, sixteen participants were secured for the study 
(Table 1). 
 
For the collection of data we employed the Critical Incident Technique (CIT), first 
introduced by Flanagan (1954). Chell (1998) describes CIT as a qualitative interview 
procedure that facilitates the investigation of significant occurrences (events, incidents, 
processes, or issues) identified by the respondent, “the way they are managed, and the 
outcomes in terms of perceived effects” (p. 56). The choice of this technique for the 
current study was primarily related to its ability to allow the participants express their 
personal views of the described incident (Stauss & Weinlich, 1997; Walker & Truly, 
1992), its inductive nature –especially when the topic being researched has not been well 
researched (Grove & Fisk 1997), the rich data set and powerful insights it can offer 
(Zeithaml & Bitner, 2003) and its ‘cultural neutrality’ (de Ruyter et al., 1995), in that it 
invites participants to offer their own perceptions on an issue, rather than indicate their 
perceptions to researcher-initiated questions. The CIT interview was divided in two parts. 
The first part of the interview aimed at the participants ‘re-living’ a crisis they 
experienced; whereas the second part aimed at the participants’ insights about what was 
learnt from the crisis with particular focus on the challenges that early detection of 
possible crisis signals may present ( interview guide is presented in Appendix 1  
 
In order to form a fuller picture of the context, the details and the effects of the critical 
incident on the organization, we also analysed documentary and other evidence provided 
by the participants and other sources in order to corroborate and augment the evidence 
from the participants accounts (internal reports, consultancy reports, meeting minutes, 
memos and e-mails, policy statements, standard operating procedure manuals, training 
manuals, articles and press coverage of the critical incidents reported, etc.). In certain  
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Table 1 – Study Participants 
 
Participant Type of 
Business 
Scope of 
Business 
Title Gender Risk/Crisis 
Experience 
Critical Incident 
A Hotel 
Group 
South 
Europe 
N. Africa 
CEO M 36 years Food Poisoning 
B Hotel 
Group 
Global VP Risk 
Management 
M 18 years Water System 
Contamination 
C Hotel 
Group 
EMEA VP Corporate 
Security 
M 23 years Suicide Bombing 
D Hotel 
Group 
Global VP Risk 
Management 
M 28 years Averted Terrorist 
Attack 
E Theme 
Park 
Global VP Loss 
Prevention 
M 16 years Boycott by 
Conservative 
Groups 
F Hotel 
Group 
Central 
Europe 
CEO F 13 years Racism Rumour 
G Hotel 
Group 
North 
America 
Corporate 
Director of 
Security 
M 14 years Workplace 
Violence 
H Hotel 
Group 
Europe 
South 
America 
Chief 
Information 
Officer 
M 6 years Online Extortion 
I Hotel 
Group 
Global VP Business 
Continuity 
F 7 years Hurricane 
Katrina 
J Hotel 
Group 
South 
Europe 
CEO M 10 years Loss of Key 
Personnel 
K Hotel 
Group 
Global VP Global 
Asset 
Management 
M 13 years Hurricane 
Katrina 
L Hotel 
Group 
Asia Pacific Global 
Director of 
Loss 
Prevention 
M 7 years Food Poisoning 
M Hotel 
Group 
North 
America 
Director of 
Security 
M 16 years 9/11 
N Hotel 
Group 
North 
America 
VP Risk 
Management 
M 24 years Hurricane Wilma 
O Hotel 
Group 
Asia Pacific VP Corporate 
Security & 
Safety 
M 10 years Car Bombing 
P Hotel 
Group 
Risk 
Management 
Director 
 M 15 years 9/11 
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occasions, the analysis of secondary evidence indicated the need of a follow-up interview 
with some participants for further clarification of certain aspects of the critical incident, 
which was granted in every occasion. The interviews were transcribed verbatim and the 
transcripts were sent back to the respondents for their review of content and interpretation 
accuracy. Any amendments made in the transcripts were taken as primary data for the 
analysis and the information previously recorded was discarded. This process, also 
known as ‘member checking’, adds both internal (authenticity check) and external 
validity (transferability) to the overall study (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The verified 
interview transcripts were coded and analysed using N-Vivo 7 which enabled us to 
identify themes and categories and to organise the responses according to these.  In order 
to ensure the reliability of the analysis, we followed the accepted practice of employing 
third parties to perform the same analysis independently (Paraskevas, 2001). Two 
academics in risk management were engaged with the task to read, sort and classify the 
interview findings. The resulting classifications did not show significant differences from 
the one produced by us. To further ensure reliability with a test-retest reliability check, 
the two analysts were invited to perform the same task for a second time, eight weeks 
later. The two analyses resulted in a 96 per cent agreement which is considerable higher 
than the prescribed level of acceptance for exploratory research, which is “in the order of 
0.6” (Paraskevas, 2001).  
 
5. Findings  
 
5.1. Existence of Crisis Signals 
In this study, we aimed at the recall of the ‘one’ crisis that was so significant (shaping 
their view of crisis management) for the participants, that they had to think it over and 
over again many times in their lives with all its details. Table 1 shows that these critical 
incidents cover a wide range of events with a reasonable degree of overlap or similarities 
(9/11, hurricanes, etc.). In almost all cases (except 9/11 and the car bombing) the 
participants admitted that there were adequate warning signals prior to the crisis which 
were either ignored or misinterpreted.. In order to justify their claim, the participants 
were probed to offer details about these signals and in all cases they did (statistics, 
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metrics, reports, etc.). However, in spite of their admission of warning signals, they did 
not all categorically label their crisis as “predictable” but used expressions such as “could 
possibly be predicted”, “there were some signs that might have led us to a prediction”, 
etc. (Participants B and G). The ability to make meaningful use of these signals depends 
on individuals (arrogance, fatalistic approach to life, denial of crisis or mere inability to 
understand the threat) but, according to most participants, predominantly on the culture of 
the organization. They have all emphasised the need for a crisis signal detection culture 
as part of an organization-wide crisis culture that should be embedded at all levels of the 
organization and by which everyone who notices an abnormality is responsible to report 
it to a decision making centre. Such culture distinguishes a ‘crisis averse’ from a ‘crisis 
prone’ organization. Having said that, they all agreed also in that not every crisis is 
predictable or emits warning signals.  Participant B stated that a pre-condition for 
effective detection and response to an emerging crisis is the in-depth understanding of 
threats and risks the organization is facing. This, according to B “is the cornerstone of 
our crisis management actions; we know that we cannot be possibly prepared for 
everything but our aim is to be able to limit the damage from the unthinkable”.  Such 
understanding, however, is not always possible, due to the complexity of certain crises (as 
in the case of Katrina – Participants I and K) or because the organizations involved are 
unable to capture the full scale of cause and effect (Participants B and K used the term 
“crisis puzzles”) as the effect may be the result of multiple causes or one cause may have 
multiple effects. Participant B stressed the need of a wide range of detectors paralleling 
signal detection with a radio: “if you are tuned to only one frequency, you will catch the 
signals broadcasted only in that frequency”. Pointing out that they had all the crisis 
signals for a hurricane and they were prepared for it, Participant K stated that they could 
never expect a “package of three crises in one: hurricane, flood and social unrest”. In 
other cases (e.g., 9/11) crises may simply be unthinkable (all participants used this term 
during the interviews). Several participants (A, B, J, L, M, P) also noted that some crises 
may be known for quite some time and emit clear signals but as they continuously evolve 
together (co-evolve) with the prevention/mitigation measures in a form of “arms race” 
(e.g., terrorism, cybercrime, etc.), their final form and impact cannot be easily predicted. 
Participant F made the point that signals may be there but are not always specific. She 
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further argued that in most cases where crisis signals exist, they point towards a “range of 
possible courses” that a crisis may take.  
 
5.2. Scanning for Crisis Signals 
All participants agreed that signal detection should be at the centre of any crisis 
management effort in the organization and should become its “first line of [crisis] 
defence”. The first step that was suggested (Participants B, D, N, P) was to look for 
specific signals such as “lagging and leading indicators” identified through the analysis, 
understanding and prioritisation of known threats. These signals can be complemented by 
ad hoc information gathered by random and expert networks. The participants used terms 
such as “structured”, “planned”, “targeted” and “robust” to differentiate this type of 
signal detection process from the passive, ad hoc capture of crisis signals from random 
sources. A good part of the participants (A, B, C, D, G, H, N and P) related this condition 
with formal risk assessment and business impact analysis practices and emphasised the 
development of specific indicators for emerging threats.  One participant commented: 
“This should not be a ‘one-off’ exercise … [but] a continuous process … because threats 
evolve and so should the signals”.  
 
Most participants admitted that their signal scanning activities are looking for ‘ground 
truth’, for ‘what is out there’ and not ‘what will possibly be’. Only participants B and I 
organised ‘retreats’ for scenario planning, situational awareness and exploration of key 
employees’ perceptions of the future (typically though from their risk management 
divisions rather that the entire organization) in a form of active, unstructured scanning for 
emerging crisis signals.  
 
5.3. Signal Detectors 
The terms most used by the participants to describe the process of signal detection was 
“network” (74 mentions in all 16 interviews) and “grid” (23 mentions in 10 interviews). 
The analysis of the interviews showed that the panellists understand this network as 
consisting of three parts (Table 2).  
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Table 2 – A Typology of Crisis Signal Detectors (Human) 
 
 
 Non-specialist Specialist 
Core    Detectors • All members of the organization  
• Key suppliers 
• Key customers  
• Government Agencies 
• Industry Bodies  
• Assigned detection specialists (e.g., 
risk analysts, security experts, etc.) 
• Intelligence vendors (e.g., business 
intelligence services, internet 
scanning, press clipping, media 
monitoring, etc.) 
Ad Hoc Detectors • Customers 
• Competitors 
• Crisis-specific vendors (e.g., 
security agencies, disaster recovery 
services, business continuity 
services, crisis counselling, etc.) 
Expert Detectors  • Crisis consultants 
• Think-tanks 
 
 
First, a core signal detection network where the detectors are predominantly members of 
the organization spread in every part of it but also a number of detectors outside the 
organization that are formally connected with the organization. The panellists agree that 
the role of detector should be assumed by everyone in the organization (participants D, H, 
G), however, some of them (B, I, K, L) believe that there should also be people especially 
assigned (detection specialists) to perform this task (“watchdog”, “counter-terrorism 
expert”, “risk analyst”, etc.).   Other detectors that could be part of the core signal 
detection network might be non-specialist detectors not directly employed by the 
organization such as regular suppliers, key customers, government agencies (non-
specialist because their primary function is not the one of signal detection) and specialist 
detectors such as vendors of intelligence services (business intelligence, internet 
scanning, press clipping and media monitoring services, etc.) formally employed by the 
organization. A second part of the organization’s signal detection network is a set of 
short-lived random networks that can provide useful information and warning signals 
when a situation arises. Normally, these networks are formed ‘ad hoc’ by customers 
(participants A, D, F, G, O), competitors (participants B, D, E, F, N) or vendors 
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specialised in crisis-specific services (participants D, E, I, J, O) such as security, disaster 
recovery, business continuity, crisis counselling, etc. and last only for a short period of 
time when an issue is evolving into a crisis. Finally, according to the participants (D, G, 
H, I, M, O), the organization’s signal detection network can also include a third part, the 
expert networks to which it can connect either formally (consultants) or informally (think 
tanks) when needed. 
 
5.4. Signal Capture 
When discussing about signal capture, the participants mainly talked about the ability of 
detectors to recognise patterns outside the normal. Participant F suggested that her 
revenue manager should be able to identify a subtle but unusual spate of cancellations 
when a viral online rumour got out about racist practices in their hotel chain, way before 
this escalated into a full blown crisis. Several participants noted that organizations fail to 
learn from crisis experiences because they do not have established mechanisms needed to 
formalise, codify and share the lessons learned. Others (A, C, D, G, M) talked about the 
need for the creation of a crisis knowledge database (some used the term ‘repository’) 
which will help both the detectors and the decision makers in the organization to identify 
similarities with past crises when an abnormality occur. Participant O emphasised that 
such a database would also offer a ‘repertoire’ of responses thus enabling a faster 
reaction of management to a given series of crisis signals. However, although many 
participants agreed in principle with the idea, they dismissed it from a practical point of 
view. Participant I argued that “such a database will be impossible to be created by one 
organisation; we are not the CIA!” When prompted about a ‘repertoire’, Participant L 
was very sceptical saying that it may limit response to more complex crises: “this 
matching of information approach will direct us respond according to what this 
repertoire suggests rather than the crisis we actually experience. When your only tool is 
a hammer, all problems will look like nails.” Other respondents though suggested that 
some forms of crisis knowledge databases already exist, mentioning organizations such 
as FEMA and OSAC who also issue warnings when they capture signals indicating 
abnormalities in certain geographic locations and gave examples on how they were 
exploiting this ‘knowledge’. The proponents of crisis knowledge repositories suggested 
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that such an endeavour could also be achieved at industry level through private-public 
partnerships or even through the UNWTO. 
 
The main challenges for signal capture according to the participants are the background 
noise (unclear or confusing signals) and the information overload (multiple and diverse 
crisis signals).  Participant I illustrated her response by saying that on the first day of the 
hurricane Katrina, the group’s hotels in the region received at least nine reports of levee 
breeches and eight other reports for major flooding. However, at the same time the Army 
Corps of Engineers insisted that they were no levee breaches and FEMA was claiming 
that they were coping. With several communication gaps due to the hurricane itself the 
hotels could not really understand what signals were genuine and what not. However, in 
such situations another challenge with signal capturing is the one described by participant 
N as “the cocktail party effect” in which the detector may focus on a particular set of 
signals, ignoring completely others that may exist. Participant L illustrates this by stating 
when describing a case of a group food poisoning in a hotel in South East Asia that “the 
crisis was not caused because we did not see the warning signs. In this part of the world 
food hygiene standards are not always the highest possible and we got slack in 
maintaining a good level in all our kitchens. We knew the problem but fixing it had not 
been a priority for us. We concentrated on the wrong priorities.”  
 
5.6. Signal Transmission 
Tightly intertwined with the detection culture mentioned in 5.1 is the existence of 
appropriate communication platforms for the transmission of captured signals to the crisis 
response centre. Participant J emphasised the need for all detectors to know “how” and 
“to whom” they should send their captured crisis signals. Most participants argued that, 
with the advances in information and communication technology, the transmission of 
signals should not present many problems even for organizations whose crisis maturity 
level is quite low. Participants A and G stated that they had recently made substantial 
investment in developing their organization’s intranet and that they thought that this 
alone was enough. Strong supporters of ‘abundant and redundant’ communication 
platforms were participants C, D and P who gave several examples of the platforms they 
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use, however, it is noteworthy that these are all very large international hotel groups. 
Participant B stressed the need for availability of multiple connections as, in his 
experience, “…if you have only a couple of communication lines, signals will be 
congested and eventually lost”. Participant I also suggested that every detector should be 
able to communicate with “at the very least two persons at the next level of the 
communication chain” in order to ensure that the captured signal is not stopped by 
communication failures. However, when possible lack of financial resources was brought 
up, many participants argued that a basic communication platform with a dedicated 
phone number and an internet address would suffice as long as there is a structured crisis 
signal transmission process.  
 
For the participants, the major challenges in signal transmission are related not with the 
technology but with the human transmitters. Participant O, for example, who experienced 
a car bombing, suggested that two hotel gardeners had reported to the front office 
suspicious activity of people in a car outside the hotel but the information was ignored 
“because the receptionists thought that these uneducated peasants were not able to judge 
what behaviour is suspicious and what not”.  Similar experiences were reported by other 
participants about housekeepers, stewards and porters whose warnings were consistently 
ignored by staff in ‘higher status’ positions. Participant N talked about “tribalism” 
between departments and levels of hierarchy: “In some organizations there are first rate 
and second rate staff. In hotels, managers and receptionists tend to be taken more 
seriously whereas housekeepers, waiters and porters less.” He added that, prior to 
hurricane Wilma, housekeepers’ warnings that some guestroom window frames were not 
strong enough to withstand the hurricane force were completely ignored, resulting in a 
number of guest injuries and lawsuits.  A similar problem was reported by a number of 
participants (A, D, F, G, and K) who talked about “silos” and “silo mentality” within the 
organization which blocks the transmission of certain crisis signals to the decision 
makers. For example, participant G who experienced a case of lethal workplace violence 
maintained that that there was knowledge kept ‘locally’, within the perpetrator’s 
department and argued that “there should be a way for this knowledge to cross the 
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department’s silos and reach persons who would be able to recognise these signals as 
potentially threatening”.  
 
A further challenge brought up in the interviews was related with information overload 
and the cumulative background noise during the process of signal transmission. Many 
participants underscored the need for a “signal filtering and fusion” during the 
transmission process so that the response centre will receive a more coherent picture of 
the situation. Participants B, D and E talked about “fusion centres” whereas most 
participants used the term “hubs” in the sense of information gatekeepers or filters. Some 
participants (e.g., E and I) had already dedicated crisis information fusion centres. Not all 
participants agreed, however, with this idea with concerns concentrated mainly on the 
technology side of the issue as the decision support systems available have a significant 
cost without, thus far, having proved their value. Participant J, although agreeing in 
principle with the concept, dismissed the idea unfeasible for his organization stating that 
the cost of decision support technology or expert groups required went beyond their crisis 
management budget. This view was shared by several participants who argued that the 
collation and sense-making of the signals is done anyway by the decision makers in the 
end of the signal detection network. On the other hand, participant B suggested that 
“there is no need for specialists in order to filter and collate crisis signals” since, in his 
view, “we have to trust our staff at property, area and region level to perform this task”.  
 
 
6. Discussion 
Flanagan’s (1954:338) definition of a critical incident focuses on “extreme” events 
whereas later definitions (such as the one provided by Bitner et al., 1990 or Grove and 
Fisk, 1997) talk about events that make a significant contribution, either positively or 
negatively, to an activity or phenomenon. The study took Flanagan’s (1954) ‘extreme’ 
approach as the question focused not at any crisis the participants had faced in their 
careers but the one “that has changed their perspective on organizational crisis 
management”. This emphasis was purposeful because CIT has often been criticised as 
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having a design that may be flawed by recall bias (Michel, 2001) or other undesirable 
bias, such as consistency errors or memory lapses (Singh & Wilkes, 1996). 
 
The response that the crises described were predictable and that there were signals which 
should trigger preventive or earlier responsive action was not surprising, given the 
significant body of literature (Dekker, 2002, Fischoff & Beyth 1975; Woods, 2005) that 
talks about ‘hindsight bias’. This literature offers empirical evidence that people, in 
hindsight, have the tendency to believe that some events were more predictable than they 
actually were. Clearly, the distinction between predictable and non-predictable crisis is a 
difficult task since it largely depends on the availability of an adequate quantity and 
quality of pre-crisis signals. The participants linked these signals with varying degrees of 
predictability, confirming the view that crisis events cannot simply be predictable or 
unpredictable but lie in a continuum of predictability (Tetlock, 2005). However, the 
participants conceded that it is not the mere existence of these signals that makes a crisis 
more or less predictable but the ability firstly of the detectors and, most importantly, of 
the decision makers to interpret these signals and trigger the responsive action.  
 
This presupposes first a critical mass of competent detectors that can capture a wide 
range of different signals (the radio metaphor of participant B) and of decision makers 
who share strong ideas about what is important and what not, something that is not 
always a norm in an organization. In most situations, the interpretation of signals and, 
therefore, the definition of the unfolding crisis and its causes remain contested and 
requires much trial-and-error (especially in complex, multidimensional crises as reported 
by participants I and K), rearguard infighting and political U-turns. On the other hand, 
excessive homogeneity and conformity in detectors and decision makers leads to the 
phenomenon of groupthink hindering the ‘out of the box’ interpretation of signals, which 
is often necessary for newly emerging crises.  
 
A second factor one needs to consider, according to the responses, is that signal detection 
does not just happen by itself but it is rather a reflection of the crisis culture in the 
organization and of the organization’s structure and priorities. Consistent with the work 
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of Scheaffer et al (1998), participants reported departmental tribalism, silo mentality and 
cognitive arrogance as factors that hinder signal detection. Gilad (2004) argued that 
“functional silos” (p.17) are a consequence of organizations failing to integrate their 
different functional areas. He also posited that quite often organizations create 
information “firewalls” (p.254) within them when some signals detected in the 
environment are deemed too sensitive to be broadly shared or certain channels for 
transmission of such signals are cumbersome to use. Bazerman and Chugh (2006) used 
the term “bounded awareness” that occurs when “cognitive blinders prevent a person 
from seeing, seeking, using, or sharing highly relevant, easily accessible, and readily 
perceivable information during the decision-making process” (p.88). The question of 
priorities is also equally important. Participant L admission that they had all the warnings 
but concentrated in the “wrong priorities” reflects a not uncommon perception of some 
managers that it is preferable to avoid a cost (of responding to a series of warning signals) 
in the present when the benefits of this action may appear in the longer term or when the 
reward for responding is uncertain.  
 
With regards to where to look for and what types of signals, the participants’ responses 
were consistent with Alberts et al (2001) who argue that organizations tend to scan more 
their physical domain (through passive data collection and reporting of changes) as well 
as their informational domain (through more active and targeted scanning towards 
specific information that can signal changes and discontinuities which may constitute 
emerging threats). The ideas of leading and lagging indicators as warning signals for 
known crises are also consistent with the approaches proposed by the traditional crisis 
and disaster management literature (Berg & Pattillo, 1999; Kaminsky et al, 1998; 
Sornette, 2004). However, as the participants indicated, in complex situations and in 
newly emerging crises these signal detection approaches are not adequate. When 
considering the topic of environmental scanning, most participants admitted that their 
signal scanning activities are looking for ‘ground truth’, for ‘what is out there’ (physical 
and informational domains) and not ‘what will possibly be’ in the terms of Alberts et al. 
(2001) which can only be achieved by scanning the organization’s cognitive domain. 
Collins (1997) argues that the intelligence of the people within an organization goes 
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beyond databases and knowledge repositories and, apparently, very few organizations in 
this study tap on it (B and I with ‘retreats’ for scenario planning, situational awareness 
and exploration of perceptions of the future). 
 
As far as the detectors are concerned, the extant literature on signal detection (e.g., 
Adelman, 1998; Desouza et al., 2004; Finkelstein, 2003) underlined the importance of 
networks and the importance of connectivity and cooperation between them. However, 
the identification and classification of networks in this study departs from the traditional 
literature which broadly divides the detectors into internal and external, technical and 
non-technical (human). Focusing the discussion on human detectors, one can notice that, 
for example, Turner (1976) talks about members and non-members of the organization, 
Mitroff (2004) talks about internal detectors and gossip networks on the one hand and 
external communities, special interest groups and industry trade groups on the other and 
Regester and Ladkin (1997) about specially appointed internal detectors. During the 
interviews it was made clear that the participants did not assume clear boundaries 
between the organization and its external environment but considered these boundaries as 
blurred and dynamic. When considering employees, suppliers and customers as detectors 
one has to accept that they are also part of other special interest groups as well as of the 
wider community. Their family members and their friends may work for competitors, the 
government or industry regulators and through their relationship they may be able to scan 
a different set of signals. Contracted specialist service providers may be considered at the 
same time as internal and external detectors. In the current study the participants used as 
criteria their specialism on crisis signal detection and the strength of relationship with the 
organization (formal/strong, informal/weak).  
 
An important aspect of signal capture by the detectors but also a point of reference for 
possible responsive action for the decision makers is the proposed by many respondents 
crisis knowledge database. Such a database is consistent with Mitroff’s (1988) model 
which includes a learning mechanism as well as with other models proposed by crisis 
management scholars such as Heath (1995) and Gonzales-Herrero and Pratt (1998). The 
idea of a continuously evolving point of reference for detectors (and decision makers) to 
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facilitate the recognition of signal patterns or even enable them define a case as an 
emerging crisis was further elaborated by Mitroff (2004) who suggested that 
organizations need “world-class Crisis Learning Centers” (p.20) to study patterns 
associated with past crises (own and others’), distil critical lessons from them and ensure 
that these will shape the organization’s crisis planning in order to reduce the potential for 
future crises. Clearly, however, the cost implications of such an endeavor make it rather a 
desirable ‘add-on’ rather than an essential element for the signal detection system. The 
proposition of an industry-level (or UNWTO-level) knowledge database appears to be 
more realistic; however, there are still important practicalities to be taken into 
consideration, such as the difficulties in the codification and storage of complex multi-
dimensional crisis information (e.g., the 2004 hurricane Katrina or the 2011 Tohoku 
earthquake) or the possible bias in terms of responsive action that the information 
retrieval system may cause as a result of this codification (not every crisis is the same 
crisis). In any case, normally knowledge is local, so that any single detector or manager 
cannot have knowledge of the entire organization and its universe as a whole. Experts 
will notice signals that non-experts will not, people working inside the organization will 
notice things that externals will not and vice versa. In that way, local knowledge added 
piece by piece can fill in for the holistic knowledge a database can provide.  
  
However, this brings up two issues. First, the problem that arises from the structural, 
cultural and priority issues raised above. Nilson (1995) discusses a self-imposed 
censorship where beliefs about what may be possible and what not lead the detectors to 
ignore certain signals and focus on certain others. Seeger et al (2003: 68) called this type 
of signal bracketing “selective attention” and related it with the detector’s background, 
history, previous commitments, capacity, ease, or with the prominence of some signals. 
And second, the need for crisis signal fusion (collation) as the first step towards sense-
making and consequently decision making about crisis response. Normally when the 
integrated information reaches the response centre, it is compared with a repertoire of 
existing crisis experiences and knowledge thus validating (or not) the potential threat. 
The proposed fusion hubs should have or develop the competence to sense complete 
patterns where signals are ambiguous and data incomplete through a constant 
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reconfiguration of mental models using ‘bricolage’, scenario planning and mindfulness in 
order for them to reach a state of a ‘collective mind’ (Weick & Roberts, 1993). Once such 
level of competence is achieved, the crisis response team will be able to consciously 
respond to crisis signals based more on their shared sense of purpose and less on their 
‘repertoire’ of responses.  
 
Finally, the study revealed that with the advances of information and communication 
technology, the transmission of signals should not be a problem for an organization. 
There are different levels of communication platforms’ sophistication ranging from 
dedicated hot lines and whistle blow lines or sites to simple e-mail, phones or paper 
reporting. The participants stressed that it is not the complexity or sophistication of the 
communication platforms that matters here as much as the wider awareness of how they 
can be effectively used by the detectors.  
 
7. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to explore the concept of crisis signal detection in the context 
of the tourism industry. We first looked at the crisis literature within tourism which 
showed that tourism organizations have made significant progress towards addressing 
issues associated with crisis preparedness, containment and damage limitation, crisis 
recovery and learning from crisis. However, the extant research has not yet explored in 
depth the significant component of crisis management called crisis signal detection.  
Using basic concepts and ideas from Signal Detection Theory and the generic crisis 
management literature, we developed a conceptual framework for a three-stage process of 
crisis signals detection consisting of signal scanning, signal capture and signal 
transmission to the crisis response centre. With this framework as a basis, we then 
conducted a study on 16 corporate level executives of international tourism organizations 
in order to explore the significance of signal detection in their crisis management practice 
and the challenges they are facing.  
 
The study showed that there is a wide consensus that many crises emit warning signals  
before they manifest themselves and that although this is not a universal rule, signal 
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detection can become (in the words of a participant) an organization’s “first line of 
defence”.  This line of defence would  help in reducing the organization’s exposure to the 
adverse effects of a crisis and, perhaps in certain cases, prevent the crisis itself. Of 
course, the sophistication of this defence will vary depending on the organization’s crisis 
culture, size and financial capacity but most importantly on the ability of the detectors 
and the response decision makers to make sense of these signals. There are many 
challenges in doing so due to a number of causes which range from what is called 
‘bounded awareness’ to internal politics and hidden agendas. The executives in these 
organizations underscore the importance of an organization-wide crisis culture where 
everybody is responsible for identifying, capturing and reporting any signals that may 
indicate an emerging crisis.  
 
The effectiveness of crisis signal detection depends primarily on the organization’s 
ability to scan its environments and identify the signals that are relevant to it. In 
designing a crisis signal detection mechanism organizations should purposefully use a 
combination of core, ad hoc and expert detector networks as presented in Table 2 which 
enable the scanning for crisis signals of not only ‘what is out there’ (organization’s 
physical and informational domains) but also of ‘what will possibly be’ (organization’s 
cognitive domain). The study showed that the latter is not being actively pursued 
indicating that many opportunities of proactive action are missed.  
 
The importance of learning from crises and managing the knowledge acquired from the 
response to them was highlighted by many participants as a pre-condition for successful 
signal detection and capture through case definition and pattern recognition. However, 
the idea of centralisation and exploitation of this knowledge within an organisation 
appears to present several practical challenges (financial and technology limitations in the 
analysis, storage and retrieval of past experience) including the danger that a successful 
response in one crisis situation may not be appropriate for a similar crisis situation in the 
future. It became apparent that a timely response depends in most cases on ‘local 
knowledge’ which is quite difficult to be captured and centralised in its entirety, 
especially when signal detection relies on a complex network of detectors.   
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 Another interesting finding, related with the premise of ‘local knowledge’, was that the 
transmission of signals from the detectors to the decision makers should be relatively 
straightforward without many ‘hubs’ in between. Hubs may perhaps offer the benefit of 
filtering signals from noise and collating them in a way that may facilitate the decision 
makers to make sense of them, however, this is done at the expense of a timely response 
and it may cause the loss of important signals in the process. Therefore, the emphasis 
should be put more in the availability of communication platforms for the detectors to 
transmit the captured signals to the decision makers rather than on complex, sophisticated 
(and expensive) ‘fusion hubs’ and filtering mechanisms. Ultimately, the successful signal 
detection depends more on the ‘collective mind’ and the shared sense of purpose within 
the organisation rather than on predetermined repertoires and databases. Consistent with 
the social exchange theory principles discussed earlier in the paper, the first and most 
basic stage of crisis signal detection may simply be the sharing of time sensitive 
information and existing knowledge in an opportune fashion (for example the DHS’s 
“See Something - Say Something” campaign for terrorism). However, social exchange 
theory alone cannot capture the complexity of signal detection since, at more advanced 
levels of maturity, signal detection and the ‘collective mind’ move from the opportune 
transmission of  ‘what is’ to identifying ‘what could possibly be’ and where the signals of 
known and unknown crises could be captured.  
 
These findings have particular significance to tourism organisations since, due to their 
high interconnectivity with all aspects of society (political, economic, social, 
technological and environmental), they are more vulnerable to crises and are affected by 
every possible disruption from normalcy whether this is political or civil unrest, a natural 
catastrophe, economic recession, etc. Therefore, these findings may help practitioners 
who embark in the design of crisis management mechanisms in creating a basic 
framework of actors and conditions for the effective detection of crisis signal in their 
organization. The findings will help them identify detectors they can employ, scanning 
approaches, scanning domains and issues to be taken into consideration in the three 
stages of the detection process. For academic researchers, apart from the deeper 
 32 
exploration of three stages of the crisis signal detection, this study opens a wide range of 
areas for further investigation. For example, of great interest would be to investigate how 
the ‘crisis culture’ to which the participants in this study so often referred to can be 
developed and embedded throughout an organization. Another interesting area for 
research would be to investigate how a detection network can be populated and 
maintained, what strategies could be used for detector recruitment and engagement in 
both core and ‘ad hoc’ networks and how can these detectors could be maintained active 
and productive. Moreover, the scanning methodologies and approaches in the three 
organizational domains (physical, informational and cognitive) will differ significantly 
and this is an area that offers a wide scope for further research. One obvious direction for 
research would be to examine the efficacy of these methodologies in case studies of 
actual crises. The issue of crisis knowledge management appears to be another interesting 
avenue of research with significant implications in the design and exploitation of a signal 
detection system.  Also, this study is based only on insights and views of corporate 
executives. Practitioners at other levels of the organization, i.e., regional VPs, area 
managers, hotel general managers and chief security officers may not completely share 
these views and may offer different insights on crisis signal detection in general or in 
particular aspects of it such as detection network, reliability of ‘ad hoc’ detectors, 
attributes of ‘core’ detectors, etc. Finally, it is worth pointing out that early interventions 
may prevent a crisis but may also merely change its course and, as a dynamic 
phenomenon, evolve in a different form of crisis. Further interventions may cause further 
evolution of the crisis and this process of co-evolution offers scope for the exploration of 
all crisis management components through the lens of chaos and complexity theories. 
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Appendix 1 
 
1. Please recall a crisis that you had to 
deal with in your career and that has 
changed your perception of 
organizational crisis management. 
 
2. What went right in your response and 
what could have gone better? 
 
3. In your opinion, was this crisis 
preventable? In retrospect, do you 
think that there were any warning 
signals for this crisis?  
 
4. Who should detect them and how 
should these be communicated?  
 
5. Were there any challenges in this 
detection process and how can they be 
overcome? 
• Why did it change your perception of crisis 
management? 
 
 
• What did you and your organization learn from 
this incident? 
 
• Where (cognitive, physical, information 
domain)? 
 
 
 
• Any special crisis communication platform or 
plan? 
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